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Command of the Commons Boasts:
An Invitation to Lawfare?
Craig H. Allen*
Roll on thou deep and dark blue ocean-roll!
Ten thousand fleets sweep over thee in vain
Man marks the earth with ruin-his control
Stops with the shore
Lord Byron, Childe Harolde's Pilgrimage'
Introduction
L ord Byron's humble respect for the sea contrasts sharply with the commonly
held view of the tenth-century Danish King Canute. Canute is often (mistak-
enly) said to have believed that he could hold back the incoming tide by dint of
royal will. 2 To silence a group of courtiers prone to excessive flattery, the king is
said to have agreed to place his throne at the low tide line on the shore in Bosham,
to demonstrate the absurdity of their suggestion that he could "command the obe-
dience of the sea." Royal will failed to keep his majesty dry as the tide rose. "Just-
so," as Kipling would say.3 What might we learn from the King Canute fable? We
might start by expressing our envy for the ancient king, who at least had the good
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fortune to face a "predictable" threat environment. Even in the tenth century, the
daily tidal cycle was probably well known. The challenge facing the king in his "in-
telligence preparation of the environment" was therefore minor. The same cannot
be said for the threat environment we face in the twenty-first century, which is ev-
erywhere described as one characterized by its uncertainty and accelerating pace of
change. As one astute observer of our current situation might put it: if you do not
expect to be surprised-even shocked-by what happens next, you are not paying
attention.4 Second, one must admire the king's practical modesty. He could have
accepted the flattery, but he knew he could not "command" that great commons
known as the sea.
The first panel in this, the 2006 Naval War College, International Law Depart-
ment conference on "Global Legal Challenges: Command of the Commons, Stra-
tegic Communications, and Natural Disasters," has been asked to offer a US
perspective on current assertions regarding the US command of the commons. It is
my privilege to moderate the discussion by a distinguished panel that includes Vice
Admiral Lowell E. ("Jake") Jacoby, US Navy (retired), the immediate past director
of the Defense Intelligence Agency; Vice Admiral John G. Morgan, Jr., US Navy,
deputy chief of naval operations for plans and strategy (N3/N5); and Rear Admiral
Joseph L. Nimmich, US Coast Guard, assistant commandant of the Coast Guard
for policy and planning.
It is noteworthy that this conference takes place at a time when the intelligence
community has reliable indications that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
(DPRK) has fueled one or more Taep'o-dong 2 missiles, in apparent preparation
for a test launch of the DPRK's new intermediate-range weapon. In response, the
US missile defense system has been activated and two Aegis-equipped cruisers are
stationed off the Korean peninsula. How did we obtain our information on missile
preparation going on within one of the world's most closed societies? Why are US
warships deployed to the far western Pacific to erect a missile defense thousands of
miles from the US mainland? What does the story unfolding on the Korean penin-
sula tell us about claims to a "command of the commons"?
As the sole lawyer on the panel, the task fell to me to identify the most salient legal
issues raised by claims to command of the commons. But I was also invited to
weigh in on the involved factual and policy questions. My goals in this short article
are modest. After setting out a lawyer's response to claims of command over the
commons, I turn to a brief legal analysis of the problems raised by this so-called
hegemonic approach. The first and most obvious problem is that any assertion of
command over the commons collides head-on with the relevant international law.
The second problem-and the one strategy drafters would do well to bear in
mind-is that such assertions could invite a response from lawfare practitioners, a
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move that could jeopardize the freedom of access and maritime mobility on which
our national security depends.
5
L The Panel's Precepts
The organizers of this year's conference might well have been moved to include a
command of the commons topic after seeing a banner to that effect displayed in the
Pentagon. 6 The text of that banner is reproduced in the appendix to this article.
Our panel is asked to focus on the perspective of the United States to command of
the commons. We were provided a list of questions in advance. We are first asked,
"How broadly should the global commons be conceived (space, air, surface,
subsurface, seabed, cyber)?" Next, we are asked, "What are the primary threats em-
anating from the global commons?" Our third issue is "What role should elements
of the Intelligence Community play? How should they be integrated into a plan for
'command of the commons'?" Finally, we are told that "The CNO and the National
Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness call for a 'persistent' Intelligence, Sur-
veillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capability in the global maritime commons,"
and then asked to consider "What obstacles will we face in achieving that? Are any
of those obstacles legal ones?"
In its reference to "the commons," the Pentagon banner lists the sea (including
undersea), air, space and cyberspace. As our discussion unfolds, the three panelists
appear to adopt a somewhat broader definition of the spatial dimensions of the
commons, which includes the airspace, waters and seabed and its subsoil outside
national jurisdiction, along with outer space and the electromagnetic spectrum. 7
(Cyberspace was occasionally listed separately, though without distinguishing the
privately or publicly owned cyberspace components that fall outside the com-
mons.8 ) It takes but little imagination to appreciate the wide-ranging utility and
pervasive usage of the commons. Some serve as a buffer (particularly for insular
nations, like the United States), a highway of transit and transport, a place to lay ca-
bles and pipelines or to orbit satellites, and-infrequently for the last six decades-
a battlespace.9 Outside of naval planning circles, it is also recognized that the com-
mons are an important source of protein, a recreational arena, a key regulator of
our planetary carbon cycle and climate, and, not nearly often enough, a place of
scientific discovery. The importance of the commons in an era when the globaliza-
tion "mega-trend" penetrates nearly every corner of the planet is undeniable.
In addition to questions about the spatial dimensions of the commons, it is nec-
essary to address the more difficult temporal and conceptual dimensions of"com-
mand." By temporal, I mean whether the command referred to is meant to prevail
in times of peace and war (to the extent that dichotomy any longer has meaning).
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By conceptual, I mean the dimensions or degree attached to the claim of control. In
the law of the sea context, the relationship between the State and a body of water is
variously described in terms of "sovereignty," "sovereign rights," and "jurisdic-
tion." 10 Assuming that "command" means something less than sovereignty over
the sea (or any other common), what are its conceptual dimensions? The goals of
sea command or control are relatively easy to identify. They typically include the
goal of ensuring freedom of access and movement for warships, auxiliaries and
supporting merchant vessels. Such access is essential to a power projection strat-
egy. The National Defense Strategy appears to stop here; calling only for a capability
to "operate from" the global commons, not to control them." At times, however,
claims to access take the form of presence, persistent presence, seabasing and per-
haps even "global fleet stations." And at times sea command or control strategies
include denying use of the sea to one's adversaries, at least during periods of
conflict.
In assessing the bounds of what might be included in a "command" of the com-
mons, my first recourse was to a common dictionary. Were I to attempt to explain
what I meant by command of the commons to a layperson, I should assume that
person would apply the common definition (a point we lawyers often forget). In
the dictionary I consulted, the most relevant definitions for "command" included
"to have authoritative control over; to rule; to have at one's disposal; to dominate
by position." 2 "Authoritative" control implies for me some legitimate basis for ex-
ercising such control. "Rule" carries unfortunate connotations for many. On the
assumption that usage of the term in the actual national strategy documents or lit-
erature was also relevant, particularly in the present audience, I decided to conduct
a cursory literature search. The resulting definitions for command of the sea (and
its sister phrases) were all over the board. After reflecting on the US Navy's "Sea
Power 21" concept papers 13 and the Australian Naval Strategy, 4 I came to the con-
clusion that the most useful definition of "command" over a space-physical or
virtual-would have to focus on the putative commander's capability,15 capacity16
and intent. It also became clear to me that one could distinguish the fact of "com-
mand" from the grand strategy that might lead a country to pursue such a com-
mand. 7
Although it might have been easy to declare that the command of the commons
concept is too vague to serve as an organizing principle amenable to legal analysis, I
chose instead to craft a working definition that focused mainly on the sea com-
mand and would capture what appeared to be the commonly held attributes of
command constructs. For this article, I ultimately settled on a definition that in-
cludes the requisite capability and intent to ensure freedom of movement for one's
vessels (power projection) during times of peace and war; and, during times of
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armed conflict, to deny such movement to one's enemies (sea denial); and to exert
that measure of control over neutral or unidentified craft that the law of neutrality
permits (sea control).18
II. Assessing the Claim to US Command of the Commons
The claims espoused in the Pentagon banner find support in the 2003 article
"Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony," by
MIT professor and Strategic Studies Program Director Barry Posen. Indeed, one
suspects the banner authors had carefully studied Posen's works. Writing in Inter-
national Security, Professor Posen described his concept of command of the com-
mons as the capability to effectively deny use of the commons to any other nation
and to prevail in any military contest for the commons.' 9 He then went on to argue
that the United States already enjoys de facto command of the commons; by which
he means the sea, deep seabed, space and international airspace, and that com-
mand of the commons has supported the hegemonic grand strategy pursued by the
United States since the late 1990s. 20 In explaining his use of the term, Posen
equated "command of the sea" with what the historian Paul Kennedy referred to as
"naval mastery"-more than mere superiority, but certainly less than claims to
"rule" over space. 2' Posen admits that "command of the commons" does not mean
that other States cannot use the commons in peacetime, nor does the concept gain-
say that there will be contested areas-the littoral and riverine regions, continental
urban centers and jungles (but none of those areas are within anyone's working
definition of the commons anyway). The true commons, Posen asserts, are com-
manded, under his definition, by the United States. He then concludes with a
warning that "U.S. command of the commons provides an impressive foundation
for selective engagement. It is not adequate for a policy of primacy."
22
A. The Claim to De Facto Command of the Commons
Applying the chosen test of capability, capacity and intent to claims of command of
the commons leaves me with considerable doubt regarding the accuracy of those
claims. Vice Admiral Jacoby's warning only increased that doubt.23 On the con-
trary, it seems to me that the claims to a command of the commons reflect a trou-
bling combination of unjustified confidence regarding a very uncertain threat
environment 24 and a tin ear regarding the effect such claims are likely to have upon
much of the audience of greatest concern to us. I could add that assertions that the
United States presently enjoys command of the commons failed to impress the
conference attendees I overheard, who, like skeptical Missourians, insisted on
proof. Indeed, the reaction by one attendee to the title of this panel went something
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like: "We couldn't 'command' the commons with a 600-ship navy. How could we
be expected to do it with 280 ships, 200,000 fewer sailors, and an ever-shrinking
merchant fleet?" 25 Another asked, "If we command the commons, why can't we
stem the flow of illegal migrants and narcotics into our country?"
A quick look at the numbers is not likely to instill confidence in the Missourians.
The seas cover 71% of the planet. The Pacific Ocean alone covers 64 million square
miles (admittedly, some of which falls within the national waters of coastal States).
If all 12 US Navy aircraft carriers were available to patrol the Pacific, each would
still be responsible for an area of more than 5 million square miles (if you assume
six-month deployment rotations, you must double that number). Those who sug-
gest that the focus should be on targets of potential interest, not surface area, would
do well to consider the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development's
recent annual report on shipping, which puts the number of merchant vessels in
the world at more than 600,000.26 That would cut down the carrier workload to
just 5,000 vessels each. Of course, that does not include the growing fleet of un-
manned vehicles operating on, under and over the seas. As a final feasibility mea-
sure, I thought back to the 2004 Northern Command Homeland Defense
Symposium, where it was emphasized that the United States plainly lacks a mari-
time surveillance system anything like the one the North American Aerospace De-
fense Command (NORAD) provides for the air domain. Although some progress
has been made using Automatic Identification System (AIS) and Long Range Iden-
tification and Tracking (LRIT) systems, maritime domain awareness still has a long
way to go.
The lawyers among us will be quick to point out that any assessment of our "ca-
pability" to command the commons must include an assessment of our legal au-
thority to act. As the 2003 So San incident demonstrated,27 military capability
unaccompanied by an adequate prescriptive and enforcement regime will some-
times utterly fail to produce the desired end state. Spanish Marines proved to be
powerless to achieve a goal where the law fell short. Our legal authorities and capa-
bilities are plainly not adequate to even "secure" the commons, let alone "com-
mand" them sufficiently to protect us against maritime terrorism or weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) transport. The fact that the common four-part "DIME"
inventory of the instruments of national power (diplomatic, information, military
and economic) omits our law enforcement capabilities and capacities may be
partly to blame for this blind spot in most maritime strategy thinking.
Capability is also a function of vulnerability. Ex ante claims to command of
international airspace must be reassessed in an age when even terrorist organiza-
tions have access to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and missiles-including
missiles capable of taking one of Israel's most modern warships out of action. 28
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Similarly, any claim to a "command" of outer space must be tempered by the
knowledge of the vulnerability of satellites to laser or missile attack, a high-altitude
nuclear explosion, or jamming from the ground,29 and to the growing ease of ac-
cess our adversaries now have to commercial satellites such as Google Earth TM and
Digital Globe'. The vulnerability of vital communication cables strung across the
deep seabed and of critical military and commercial networks to "cyber-attack"
30
similarly renders doubtful any claim that the nation has attained "command" of ei-
ther of those domains. On the contrary, we can only hope that a defense establish-
ment that connects and leverages its now lighter and more dispersed forces
through a networked information and communications grid has studied the "un-
restricted warfare" battle plan and has not thrown out its semaphore flags. 3' In re-
sponse to those who might argue that such vulnerability represents only the
potential to lose command of the commons, and does not diminish present com-
mand, I would be tempted to respond by asking how they distinguish "command"
from the more temporally limited concept of "superiority."
In short, my initial look at the numbers fails the Missouri "show me" test. In-
deed, one might be moved to remonstrate that the only reason that a claim to
"command" of the commons is plausible at present is because no one is out there
contesting the commons. The interest has moved to the littorals, ports and land
domains. Witness China's so-called "String of Pearls" ambition, to ensure access to
sea lines of communication connecting it to the Persian Gulf oil fields through a
string of bases stretching from Gwandar, Pakistan to Hainan Island.32 In these do-
mains-the favored battlespace of the fourth-generation warfare practitioners-
the fates of the USS Stark, USS Cole, USS Kearsarge and USS Ashland,33 and the INS
Hanit belie any notion of command. Here, there be dragons, and their riders are
reading Mao and Ho Chi Minh, the Small Wars Manual3 4 and the Sling and the
Stone.35
B. Command of the Commons as a Hegemonic Grand Strategy Element
The Pentagon banner includes a citation to Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan,
suggesting that the banner authors' concept of command of the commons has its
roots in a larger strategy. Why Mahan, and why that particular passage? Is the De-
partment of Defense suggesting that a strategy calling for command of the com-
mons will be found in the old "foundations of strategy" that were "laid upon a
rock"? Did Mahan believe that the United States would "guarantee" other States
"their freedom to navigate the sea, air or space," as the banner claims? With the
trepidation any lawyer should feel before wading into national defense strategy, I
decided to see just what Mahan stood for.
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I took as my point of departure the belief that grand strategy, including its for-
eign policy elements, can be a useful window into a nation's intent with regard to
the commons.36 What do the US strategy documents say about the nation's intent
with respect to the commons? My brief study of the literature persuades me that
the evolutionary path of maritime and naval strategy in the United States has not
been linear (Justice Holmes made a similar remark with regard to the evolution of
the common law 37). It demonstrates many of the characteristics of the dialectic,
while occasionally producing what economic historians might call a logistic surge,
what Thomas Kuhn described as a revolutionary paradigm shift,3 8 or what evolu-
tionary biologists refer to as punctuated equilibrium. Essentially all such con-
structs describe a cycle of peaceful interludes punctuated by dramatic revolutions.
Futurist Alvin Toffler warned that the frequency of that cycle is rising sharply. 39
Peter Schwartz adds that surprise-by which he means discontinuities-should no
longer be surprising.40 Current indications suggest we might be on the verge of just
such a shift in grand strategy, as the mass of antithetical evidence and sentiment
grows. Justice Holmes, a battle-tested Civil War veteran, would likely agree.
Over the years, naval and maritime strategy documents and treatises have
adopted a variety of terminology to refer to the ends and means that make up the
grand strategy. The choices are informed by history, policy, capability and per-
haps even a little bit of law. Navies (and merchant fleets) figure prominently.
The Greek historian Herodotus makes it clear that the Athenian navy's defeat of
the much larger Persian fleet at the Battle of Salamis (480 BC) was a decisive vic-
tory for the Greeks. Indeed, Athens' naval "superiority," obtained more by strat-
egy and skill than by relative fleet size, was the city-State's signature strength for
nearly eight decades (it was lost when Athens executed most of its naval leaders,
leading to a defeat by Sparta). 4 1 Moving forward from the Greek and Roman expe-
riences to the modern era, we see several shifts in the ends and means elements in
strategy documents. They raise questions regarding distinctions between "superi-
ority" in a given domain and "control" or "command" of that domain, and be-
tween the concept of "naval" superiority (or strategy) and "maritime" superiority
(or strategy), and whether these are ends or means, and whether they are merely
notional or aspirational. And finally, is it only the primacists who seek to "control"
the commons?
Any examination of "sea control" and the correlative opportunity for "power
projection" begins with Captain (later Rear Admiral) Alfred Thayer Mahan and
Rear Admiral Stephen Luce, first president of the US Naval War College. Mahan
was a naval officer and Naval War College professor (and later president) who
characterized the sea as a "wide common." 42 The commons included potential
battlespaces, where the naval combatants would mass and meet, and sea lines of
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communication, through which both warships and merchant vessels traveled. His
magisterial 1894 book, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, reveals Mahan as a
naval strategist who saw sea control as the paramount goal of naval strategy. 43 He
rejected the coastal defense and commerce raiding strategy of the day and offered
in its place a vision of naval warfare as a contest for command of the sea. In
Mahan's view, sea control was essential for a belligerent to be assured of access to
the sea and freedom of mobility, while denying such access or movement to the op-
ponent.44 Later asymmetric strategies did not so much challenge Mahan's assump-
tions; rather, they looked for ways to circumvent the adversary's control of the seas.
In his 1911 treatise Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, Sir Julian Corbett took
a broader and slightly less aggressive approach, rejecting what he considered to be a
"big-battle fixation" by writers who advocated the principle of concentration.
45
Corbett distinguished "naval strategy," which focuses on command of the sea,
from "maritime strategy," which focuses on the interplay between naval and land
forces. To Corbett, naval strategy was but a subset of the maritime strategy, the
purpose of which was to accomplish the sovereign's broader goals. He admonished
that command of the sea was not a proper goal in and of itself but rather a strength
that could be employed to support the nation's overall military objective. 46 Corbett
concluded (as does Vice Admiral Jacoby) that it is rarely possible to achieve full
control of the sea. He argued that a belligerent must always attempt to either secure
command of the sea or prevent its opponent from doing so. 47 Nevertheless, he con-
cluded that the "most common situation in naval war is that neither side has the
command; that the normal position is not a commanded sea, but an uncommand-
ed sea."48
In 1954, a very young Samuel Huntington penned an unsettling article an-
nouncing that, in his view, the Mahanian strategy based on the clash of great fleets
massing against each other was obsolete. 49 Viewing the Soviet Union as a massive
land-force power that posed little or no naval threat, Huntington concluded that
the US Navy force structure should be reshaped to prepare it for littoral warfare
and power projection ashore.50 John Keegan, in his Price of Admiralty, carries the
concept forward; or should I say upward and downward? Looking back to World
War II, and demonstrating how technology can quickly reshape the meaning of
command of the commons, he concludes that the US Navy's aircraft carriers were
the "supreme instrument of command of the sea" in that war.51 But, then, turning
to the present, he falls prey to the sin of presentism, asserting that "command of the
sea in the future unquestionably lies beneath rather than on the surface." Keegan
acknowledged, however-quite prophetically-that future naval battles will likely
be fought close to land, where there is less maneuvering space.
5 2
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Command of the sea reached its most recent apogee with the appointment of
John Lehman to serve as President Reagan's secretary of the Navy. Secretary
Lehman is, of course, known as the author of the 600-ship Navy and "the" mari-
time strategy. Writing in his autobiography, Command of the Seas, Lehman reports
considerable pushback in response to his maritime superiority strategy by those
who considered it too ambitious and too provocative.5 3 Nevertheless, some give
considerable credit to the aggressiveness of Lehman's strategy and force buildup
for the eventual capitulation of the Soviet Union.
As the Reagan era came to a close and with it the Cold War, naval strategy took a
decisive turn inland. Two capstone documents of the 1990s, From the Sea in 199254
and Forward... From the Sea in 1995, 55 demonstrated that the focus on command
of the sea had given way to a need to establish "forward presence," and that
Mahan's blue-water battles between major combatants would give way to green-
and brown-water activities and "maritime security operations." 56 For some, it
looked like coastal defense and blockades were back in style. As one analyst put it
more than a decade ago: "From the Sea writes the epitaph to the command of the
sea 'system' that has dominated naval strategic thought since the sixteenth century
when, thanks to the growth of seaborne commerce and the development of war-
ships capable of keeping the sea, 'true naval war' replaced 'cross-ravaging' as the
main purpose of military power at sea."'57 The intervening years have mostly borne
that out, as naval forces have been extensively engaged in maritime security opera-
tions in the littorals of the Greater Mideast and in "projecting" power from the sea
into the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq.
As we reflect back on a history that includes Salamis, Trafalgar, Midway, the
Barbary Pirates and Cole, and briefly consider the various naval and maritime strat-
egies that have competed for adherents, the lesson may be that any notion of com-
mand of the commons is held hostage by the competition for the strategic vision.
Professor Posen makes a strong case for his claim of US hegemony.5 8 He traces the
path to our current hegemonic posture to the late 1990s, while recognizing that the
hegemonic character of the strategy got an injection of steroids with the 2002
National Security Strategy 9 (though only for contested areas or with respect to
specific threats, not for the commons). But, as noted earlier, he concludes that the
hegemonic status, while sufficient for an effective strategy of selective engagement,
is not adequate to support a policy of primacy (elements of which are contained in
the 2002 National Security Strategy).60 In the dialectic of grand strategy, there are
clear signs that US thinking is backing away from its flirtation with primacy.
Whether it lands on Posen's selective engagement or some variant of offshore bal-
ancing or strategic restraint is an open question. Are the differences among the
strategies important for the legal analysis that follows? Perhaps. To the extent that
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both primacy and selective engagement rely on some level of hegemonic command
of the commons, they both raise legal questions. There is also good reason to be
concerned that a strategy that purports to command what others consider com-
mon is likely to be opposed; and the opposition might well draw on all of the in-
struments of national (and non-State) power, including lawfare to frustrate the
hegemon's design.
1. The National Security Strategy Capstone Documents
Current US high-level strategic plans embrace some elements of primacy, along
with cooperative security and selective engagement. The 2002 National Security
Strategy called on the Department of Defense to ensure its current military domi-
nance was not challenged.6 1 The 2006 National Security Strategy reiterates that
"[w] e must maintain a military without peer." 62 The Clinton-era Department of
Defense Joint Vision 2020 established the goal of "full spectrum dominance," which
was carried into the 2004 National Military Strategy.63 At the same time, however,
both the 2006 National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy ac-
knowledge that the United States lacks the capability to address global security
alone.64 Moreover, the National Defense Strategy expressly disclaims any intent to
achieve "dominance" in all areas of military capability. 65 And far from a pretension
of presently commanding the commons, it asserts that "[w]e will operate in and
from the commons by overcoming challenges to our global maritime, air, space
and cyberspace operations." 66
Other national strategy documents embrace a cooperative, multilateral ap-
proach. The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction67 and the
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism68 both rely on cooperative, multilateral
and interagency approaches. The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass
Destruction recognizes that "it is vital that we work closely with like-minded coun-
tries on all elements of our comprehensive proliferation strategy." 69 Similarly, the
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism calls for strengthened coalitions and
partnerships, including partnerships with international organizations. 70 The Pro-
liferation Security Initiative 7l and the concept once referred to as the 1,000-ship
navy72 similarly embrace the multilateral approach.
National Security Presidential Directive 41 on maritime security policy clearly
emphasizes the need for cooperation-combined, joint and interagency-in the
pursuit of security in the maritime domain. 73 In calling for a new National Strategy
for Maritime Security (NSMS), the president described the "maritime domain" as
"all areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea,
ocean, other navigable waterway, including all maritime-related activities, infra-
structure, people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyances." 74 The NSMS and its
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eight supporting plans were promulgated in 2005.75 Rear Admiral Joseph
Nimmich and Dana Goward, writing in this volume, explain that the hallmarks of
the national strategy for maritime security are its commitment to obtaining mari-
time domain awareness, sharing the intelligence, providing a common operating
picture, and establishing and enabling a layered defense.76 In the words of many,
"information superiority" will give way in the coming months to "information
sharing" (a concept that might not sit well with primacists). The president's direc-
tive also makes it clear that the strategy will be carried out in a way that respects the
rule of law and does not unnecessarily impede legitimate maritime commerce.
2. The Coming Maritime Strategy: Has Command of the Commons Given Way to
"Awareness" of the Maritime Domain and the Emerging Global Maritime
Partnership?
At the 2006 Current Strategy Forum held shortly before our conference, the Chief
of Naval Operations, Admiral Mike Mullen, called for the development of a new
maritime strategy to guide the Navy in the coming years. 77 The new strategy docu-
ment will join three other capstone planning documents, including Sea Power 21,78
the Navy Strategic Plan79 and the CNO-CMC Naval Operations Concept,80 along
with the forthcoming revision to the Naval Doctrine Publication on Naval Warfare
(NDP-1). The strategy is also likely to embrace what was once referred to as the
1,000-ship navy concept l (now the Global Maritime Partnership) and the Na-
tional Fleet Policy.82 And the strategy will be consistent with higher-level plans, in-
cluding the National Security Strategy and the National Strategy for Maritime
Security. At the time this article was prepared, it was not clear what path the new
maritime strategy would take. Primacy, selective engagement, 83 cooperative
security84 and offshore balancing were all being examined in what has been known
as a "competition of ideas" that seeks to cull the best from the "wisdom of groups."
Some have strongly advocated some version of offshore balancing, 85 while Posen
and others appear to favor a return to Clinton-style selective engagement. The de-
bate over grand strategy has clearly moved beyond naval planning circles to both
the national and global stages.8 6
It seems safe to say that global maritime security is now seen by most as a team
sport, but one that involves States of disparate ability and willingness. The advent
of regional maritime security initiatives and risk-specific approaches like the Pro-
liferation Security Initiative may portend the new modalities that will replace com-
mand and control approaches. Whether the threat comes from regional armed
conflicts or Malaccan pirates, this increasingly globalized world plainly benefits
from a maritime security approach that protects the sea lines of communication
for peaceful navigation, commerce and overflight. While those common rights are
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protected by international law, it is sometimes said that covenants without the
sword are but words.
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III. Command of the Commons and the Law
Turning from an amateur's examination of the policy questions presented to our
panel to the legal question, two issues present themselves. The first concerns the le-
gality of any claim to control over the commons, particularly if control takes the
form of sea denial or assertions regarding access or presence exceeding those pro-
tected by the law. The second is one well suited for the Naval War College audience
and concerns the potential lawfare use of a maritime strategy that purports to com-
mand the commons.
A. Command of the Commons and the International Law of the Commons
Lord Bryon was not available to the young Dutch jurist, Hugo Grotius, who wrote
his famous Mare Liberum (the sea is free) in 1608,88 but Grotius would almost cer-
tainly have appreciated Byron's respect for the sea. Grotius' Mare Liberum was the
opening salvo in the "battle of the books" with the Englishman John Selden. Selden
opposed Grotius' freedom of the seas concept with his own Mare Clausum (the sea
is closed) ten years later.8 9 Grotius eventually won the battle for freedom of the
seas. Even England eventually repudiated Selden's thesis. In one of Lord Stowell's
most often-quoted decisions while on the English High Court of Admiralty, he ex-
plained that two principles of public international law are recognized as
"fundamental":
One is the perfect equality and entire independence of all distinct states. Relative
magnitude creates no distinction of right; relative imbecility, whether permanent or
casual, gives no additional right to the more powerful neighbour; and any advantage
seized upon that ground is mere usurpation. This is the great foundation of public law,
which it mainly concerns the peace of mankind, both in their politic and private
capacities, to preserve inviolate.
The second is, that all nations being equal, all have an equal right to the uninterrupted
use of the unappropriated parts of the ocean for their navigation. In places where no
local authority exists, where the subjects of all states meet upon a footing of entire
equality and independence, no one state, or any of its subjects, has a right to assume or
exercise authority over the subjects of another. I can find no authority that gives the
right of interruption to the navigation of states in amity upon the high seas, excepting
that which the rights of war give to both belligerents against neutrals .... 90
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Modernly, the sovereign equality of States is enshrined in the UN Charter, and the
freedom of the seas-at least of the high seas-is codified in articles 87 and 88 of
the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982 LOS Convention).9 1
Military strategists are regarded by most international lawyers as contemptuous
of the law and legal institutions. Clausewitz's canonical text for strategists refers to
the "certain self-imposed, imperceptible limitations hardly worth mentioning,
known as international law and custom." 92 Foreign policy pundit George F.
Kennan is remembered for his attack on what he saw as an excess of "legalism"
(and moralism) in American foreign policy during the Wilson presidency years. 93
Although international and constitutional law scholar Philip Bobbitt has come to
Wilson's (and FDR's) defense,94 few from the strategy community have joined
him. Unfortunately, too many international lawyers are unwilling to engage the se-
curity strategists directly. They therefore have the potential to create what
Clausewitz would call "friction. 95
Most international lawyers would likely agree that, under the law, the phrase
"command of the commons" is an oxymoron. It is in the very nature of a commons
that no State has sovereignty over it. Indeed, such commons as the seabed beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction are often referred to as the "common heritage of
mankind. " 96 That said, it must also be admitted that freedom within the commons
in peacetime does not necessarily prevail when the drums beat the call to quarters.
Accordingly, a distinction must be drawn in this analysis between laws applicable
in peacetime and those that control in times of armed conflict. The former is
largely set out in the UN Charter and 1982 LOS Convention. The latter is taken
from a variety of sources including the conventional and customary law of armed
conflict, the law of neutrality, specialized doctrines of blockade, 97 and the right of
visit and search.98 No exhaustive treatment of either is attempted here; however,
command of the commons advocates must be alert to several key legal limits on
their sea command, control and denial strategies.
The UN Charter rests on the principle of the sovereign equality of all States
and prohibits the use of force-or the threat to use force-against the territorial
integrity or political independence of another State.99 Under the 1982 LOS Con-
vention, neither the high seas nor the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction are
subject to any nation's sovereignty. 00 The same is true for international airspace.
Over the years, the United States has jealously guarded high seas freedoms against
coastal State encroachments,' 10 as the recent US reaction to Australian measures
extending pilotage requirements to the Torres Strait demonstrates. 102 The high
seas and the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction are also reserved for "peace-
ful purposes."'103 And what of those 600,000 merchant ships plying the oceans?
While on the high seas, merchant vessels (and warships) come under the exclusive
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jurisdiction and control of their respective flag States, thus limiting the extent to
which a hegemon can exert denial or control strategies against them.'
4
Under relevant laws applicable during armed conflicts, neutrals generally enjoy
most of the same freedoms that prevail during peacetime, so long as they do not aid
any of the belligerents or carry contraband on their behalf. That general statement
is subject to two important qualifications, including the belligerents' right of visit
and search, 10 5 and the somewhat unsettled regime of maritime "zones."1 0 6 If, how-
ever, sea denial is reserved only for times of armed conflict, and is implemented in
accordance with the international law governing the rights and obligations of neu-
trals, the law cannot be said to preclude "command" in the sense of the ability to
deny uses of the sea in ways that conflict with those laws.
Although this brief comment will not focus on the outer space commons, it is
worth mentioning that any claim to command of outer space is difficult to recon-
cile with the legal regime established by the Outer Space Treaty. 1 7 It is also inter-
esting to note the stark contrast between the "command" notion and the
provisions of the Treaty on Open Skies, 08 which permit overflight of even the na-
tional territory of each party, to provide potential adversaries a "confidence build-
ing measure." Primacists would do well to consider why a global hegemon with
"command of the commons" would permit Russian military aircraft to overfly and
photograph its naval and air bases. But the logic in such confidence-building mea-
sures as a means of enhancing national security is likely to elude most primacists. 0 9
In closing, it is important to acknowledge that our Janus-faced law both em-
powers and limits the United States. Boasts that the Navy has the capability to in-
timidate a hostile or potentially hostile coastal State or its government by parking a
carrier battle group or expeditionary strike group 12 miles off the State's coastline
carry with them a risk that the law is neither as clear nor as stable as the boaster
might hope.
B. Assertions of Command of the Commons as an Invitation to Lawfare
The foregoing analysis focused on the legal limits on attempts to exploit putative
command of the commons to deny vessels or aircraft of another State access or
transit rights protected by international law. This section is designed to alert the
reader to the danger that an aggressive command of the commons posture may
backfire and motivate other States to undertake measures to reduce the would-be
commander's access or transit rights. It begins with the often heard assumption
that when the stronger naval power controls the sea, the "correct" strategy for the
weaker power is to attempt to deny its opponent use of the sea as much as possible."l0
The concept of lawfare might provide one means to deny, or at least to limit, a
hegemon's use of the sea.I I I
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The term "lawfare" was apparently coined in the 1970s, but initially lacked a co-
herent definition. Today the concept is most often associated with Air Force Major
General Charles Dunlap, who defines lawfare as the strategy of using or misusing
law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational objec-
tive. 112 It is noteworthy that lawfare tactics are included in the Chinese book on
"Unrestricted Warfare." 1 3 The authors suggest an approach that applies interna-
tional law asymmetrically: binding the more powerful nation, but not its less pow-
erful opponent. The authors also recognize the important role of a sympathetic
media to a lawfare strategy, as did Hezbollah during the 2006 conflict with Israel.
To be sure, the United States has never hesitated to use what has been described
as lawfare to advance its national interests. Witness the new republic's complaints
that British boardings of US merchantmen to impress seamen for duty in the Royal
Navy violated international law.ll 4 Professor Davida Kellogg, among others, advo-
cates a principled, proactive use of lawfare. 115 But she warns that we must also be
on guard against false or misleading versions of the law contained in the "pro-
nouncements of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), terrorist sympathizers
and apologists, and uninformed reporters with political agendas.""l 6
Concern for lawfare tactics found its way into at least one high-level strategy
document. The 2005 National Defense Strategy appears to expect that lawfare tactics
will be used against the United States, warning in its section on "vulnerabilities"
that "[o] ur strength as a nation will continue to be challenged by those who employ
a strategy of the weak using international fora, judicial processes and terrorism." 17
"Judicial processes and terrorism"? Putting tactless juxtapositions to one side, 1 8
the secretary is probably right to be concerned. A few suggestions show why.
If I were giving advice to a client seeking to bind a would-be maritime hegemon
through lawfare moves, several come to mind. First, I might advise the client to
identify those States that most resent claims to command of the commons and seek
their support within the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) for, inter alia,
a request that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issue an advisory opinion
condemning any attempt to "command of the commons" as a violation of the UN
Charter, the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and the 1967 Outer Space Conven-
tion, which collectively stand for the proposition of equal access for all States to
those commons. Next I would suggest that the client work through the UN Infor-
mal Consultative Process on Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea to propose a
General Assembly resolution defining "due regard for the exercise of the freedom
of the high seas" and "peaceful use" under articles 87 and 88, respectively, of the
Law of the Sea Convention in a way that renders illegal any claim to "command" of
those seas or "sea control" by any nation's warships. 19 At the same time, the client
might move for a resolution defining "innocent passage" to exclude any passage by
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warships (or unmanned vehicles, which are nowhere mentioned in the conven-
tion) the flag State of which purports to command the seas in ways that conflict
with the freedoms of other States, or to vessels en route to a "sea base" assignment
(where the vessel will, in the minds of some, "threaten" the use of force, in violation
of the UN Charter and the Law of the Sea Convention). Another tactic that is sure
to attract the support of a number of coastal States would utilize the ICJ or UNGA
to effectively reduce the commons, by legitimizing "security zones" of up to 200
nautical miles, within which no foreign warship, military aircraft (manned or un-
manned) or intelligence gathering platform could operate without the consent of
the coastal State, and only then when in full compliance with any applicable restric-
tions on vessel numbers, speed, weapons and means of propulsion, along with pos-
itive requirements to carry transponders and disclose to the coastal State any
information gathered during the transit. A final tactic might be to build upon the
suggestion of prominent publicists who argued in an earlier volume of the "Blue
Book" series that naval warfare doctrines like blockade and neutrality are no lon-
ger viable in the post-UN Charter era, 20 and would thus provide no authority for
interfering with shipping in a manner inconsistent with the 1982 LOS Convention.
Lest the reader think my goal here is to feed ideas to the nation's enemies, let me
assure you I have no such intent. My goal is to alert public and military officials to
the risk that their assertions, whether in strategy documents or banner displays,
can have serious unintended consequences. A message intended to raise the morale
of service members or garner service support in congress might lead to legal
pushback from opponents within and beyond the nation, in ways that create un-
welcome and avoidable friction over access to the commons. The Navy war games
strategies. Why not war game strategic communications? Why not ask your red
team's legal expert to game a response to any proposal for a "command of the com-
mons" campaign?
Conclusion
De facto command of the commons will be seen by many as an unattainable goal in
an age of asymmetric warfare against amorphous enemies who operate through
dispersed cells. Those who confidently speak of having such command must be
prepared to answer the practical questions regarding how the putative "command"
would fare in response to an adversary's war plan that calls for the targeting of all of
the satellites and submarine cables on which the elaborately networked command
depends in the first 96 hours. The command advocates must also address the eco-
nomics of obtaining and maintaining command. The cost of restoring the Army
and Marine Corps to their pre-Operation Enduring Freedom/Operation Iraqi
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Freedom readiness levels will almost certainly make it impossible to build and
maintain the resources effective command would require. It is unlikely that the
world will soon realize the dream that we will beat our collective swords into plow-
shares. But the coming budget showdown in the United States does suggest that
there is a growing risk that in the coming decade four Navy aircraft carriers might,
in effect, be turned into armored Humvees for the Fleet Marine Force.1 2 1
Law is a vital enabler for liberal democracies and an important safeguard for our
military forces. That law respects the sovereign equality of States and precludes any
State from asserting dominion over the commons. Strategic statements that sug-
gest a cavalier disregard for legally protected rights will almost certainly generate
resentment and produce undesired effects. Those who might be tempted to post
banners announcing "command of the commons" would also do well to reflect on
what is to be learned from the "strategic communications" panel that follows in
Part III of this volume. To make such a claim in peacetime, while the United States
is simultaneously lobbying other States to join in a 1,000-ship navy to meet the ur-
gent need for maritime security, disserves the national interest. And in an age when
much of the world and virtually all of the media seem bent on discrediting the US




Command of the Commons*
Command of the Commons is the key military enabler of the United States.
The United States now enjoys command of the commons-command of the sea
(including undersea), air, space and cyberspace. While other States can use the
commons in peacetime, the United States guarantees their freedom to navigate the
sea, air or space. Command of the commons is the key military enabler of the
United States' global power position. It allows us to utilize other sources of power,
including our own economic and military might, as well as the economic and mili-
tary might of our allies.
How do we maintain command of the commons?
Maintaining command of the sea/undersea. Command of the sea allows us to pro-
ject our national power and influence, and also enhances our country's economic
prosperity. 99% of the volume-and 80% of the value--of the world's interconti-
nental trade moves by sea. The Air Force provides battle space management, preci-
sion navigation, weather services, close air support targeting and air refueling for
both military and commercial users to solidify United States control over the sea.
From time to time the superstructure of tactics has to be altered or wholly torn down; but
the old foundations of strategy so far remain, as though laid upon a rock.
Alfred Thayer Mahan
Maintaining command of the air. Unsurpassed by any nation, the United States Air
Force maintains joint air and space dominance across the globe. Specialized attack,
jamming and electronic intelligence aircraft combined with well-trained, profes-
sional airmen allows extensive control and exploitation of air, space and near-
space domains. Given the superior capabilities the Air Force possesses, the United
States is able to deter enemy threats and ensure forward operations providing an
essential contribution to global security.
* Approximate text of a display in the Pentagon in 2006 (any formatting errors are mine alone).
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Freedom from attack; freedom to attack.
Maintaining command of space. Maintaining command of space allows the
United States to see across the entire globe in order to gather vast amounts of useful
information. Over the last 50 years the United States has invested $830 billion in
space assets. Through capabilities developed and executed by the Air Force, the
United States can track and identify military targets with fidelity and communicate
this actionable information in a timely fashion.
See first-understand first-act first.
Maintaining command of cyberspace. The new strategic communication of the
21st century is cyberspace. Like its conceptual predecessor, cyberspace is an interna-
tional domain of trade and intercontinental communication that connotes not only
the Internet but an area of information and cognition that includes the channels of
mass media and finance. Command of cyberspace can increase, sustain or diminish a
nation's position of power in economic, diplomatic or military terms.
A new medium for communications, command and control.
Craig H. Allen
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